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INTRODUCTION
An airplane crashes, leaving no survivors. The world, seeking an-
swers, awaits the discovery of the "black box" that will reveal the cause
of the crash. While the public looks to the "black box" to provide clo-
sure by explaining the reasons for an accident, "black boxes" also give
airlines, airplane manufacturers, and the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) an opportunity to improve the safety of air travel. Perhaps in part
because of the wealth of information that a "black box" provides, air-
1 Cornell Law School, Candidate for J.D., May 2008; Bachelors of Arts in Economics,
Cornell University, 2004.
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plane crashes now occur less and less frequently-especially since No-
vember 2001.2
While airplane crashes are undeniably tragic events, less well-publi-
cized car crashes take a steady, and shockingly high, toll. In 2005,
American fatalities from car accidents reached an astounding 43,200. 3 In
fact, people between the ages of 5 to 33 are more likely to die from a car
accident than from any other cause.4 Year after year the death rate re-
mains nearly the same,5 suggesting that any real progress will require a
significant change either in our transportation system or in the way we
manufacture our cars. While advances in safety technology have the po-
tential to make our cars safer in the future, it is unclear whether these
improvements will be enough to significantly reduce traffic-related
deaths. Despite the staggering number of automobile-related fatalities
each year in the United States and despite the clear need for the develop-
ment of new technology, there is little, if any, use of an analogue to the
airplane's "black box" to help understand the causes of car accidents.
Both the automobile industry and the government have been slow to in-
troduce the use of "black boxes"-or, more technically, event data re-
corders (EDRs)-in American automobiles.
The basic concept of an EDR is not a new one. Airbag sensors,
which provide information about changes in velocity, whether a person
was wearing a seatbelt, and when or if the driver applied the brakes, 6
have been in use since the 1970s and have indeed seen increasingly wide
use in recent years. 7 Nonetheless, airbag sensor technology falls short of
what could be recorded if EDRs were used to their full potential.
The fact that airplanes have more extensive data recording technol-
ogy than cars do is not surprising considering the differences between the
aviation industry and the automobile industry as well as the inherent dif-
ference between airplanes and automobiles. The high initial costs of
2 The recent Canadair crash in Lexington, Kentucky in 2006 was the first jet crash in the
United States since 2001 to involve a jet plane that did not have propellers. See Ian Urbina &
Amanda Van Benschoten, 49 Die in Kentucky Crash as Jet Takes Off From Wrong Runway,
N.Y. TIuES, Aug. 28, 2006, at Al.
3 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRANSP. SAFETY ADMIN., MOTOR VEHICLE TRAFFIC CRASH FATALI-
TIES AND INJURIES (2006), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSA/PPT/2006/
810583.pdf [hereinafter CRASH FATALITIES AND INJURIES].
4 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRANSP. SAFETY ADMIN., CRASHES ARE ToP CAUSE OF DEATHS IN
US FOR AGES 5-33 (2006), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/pdf/nrd-30/NCSAfRNotes/2006/
810568.pdf.
5 CRASH FATALITIES AND INJURIES, supra note 3.
6 General Motors has put EDRs in cars since the introduction of the airbag in 1974. Karl
A. Menninger, II, Data and Voice Recorders in Airplanes, Motor Vehicles and Trains, 84 AM.
JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 1 (2006).
7 See Patrick Mueller, Every Time You Brake, Every Turn You Make-I'll Be Watching
You: Protecting Privacy in Event Data Recorder Information, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 135, 138
(2006).
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EDR technology, the comparatively heavy regulation of the airline indus-
try, and the fact that the number of planes is small relative to the number
of cars, among other factors, explain why airplanes have more advanced
recording technology than cars.
Happily for automobile safety advocates, the disparity between the
two recording systems can, and likely will, change. EDR technology is
quickly becoming more advanced, more widely available, and less ex-
pensive. 8 However, with fewer technological and economic hurdles
preventing automobile EDRs from providing information almost as de-
tailed as that provided by "black boxes" in airplanes, 9 new concerns are
emerging. Many privacy advocates argue that the increased use of EDR
technology puts the privacy interest of drivers in danger. This Note ar-
gues that, while there are valid privacy concerns associated with the use
of EDR technology in cars, the high evidentiary and safety value of the
data collected through EDRs should not be sacrificed on the altar of pri-
vacy. There are potential solutions that address all concerns about EDRs
fairly and efficiently.
Part I examines EDR technology itself, particularly with respect to
the automobile industry, describing its history, its current state, and
trends that may change it in the future. Part II explains how the National
Highway Transportation Safety Agency (NHTSA), legislatures, courts,
and insurance companies have approached EDR data. Part III outlines
the policy concerns implicated by EDR use. Part IV critiques past model
EDR regulations and introduces legislative proposals that will preserve
the safety function of EDRs and provide better incentives for the use of
EDRs in cars, while still addressing privacy concerns.
I. EDR TECHNOLOGY THEN, NOW, AND IN THE FUTURE' 0
A. AIRBAGS AND THE INTRODUCTION OF EVENT DATA RECORDERS
Event data recorders find their origins in the first airbags, which the
automotive industry introduced in 1974.11 For airbags to work they must
have a sensor that triggers deployment when required conditions exist,
and they must also deploy rapidly to have any efficacy, so sensors must
make "deployment decisions within 15 to 50 milliseconds after im-
pact." 12 There are two types of airbag sensors common in automobiles.
8 See infra p. 205-06.
9 See infra pp. 205-07.
10 In this note, I will primarily consider event-data recorders or "black-boxes" that are
installed during the manufacturing process. While at times I will refer to the after-market
installation of similar types of devices by parents, employers and rental agencies, this will be
for the purpose of predicting future development of manufacturer-installed EDRs. See
discussion infra notes 33-50 and accompanying text.
t1 See Menninger, supra note 6, § 10.
t2 Id.
2007]
204 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:201
The first are crash pulse sensors; they are located in the front of the
vehicle and under the dashboard and trigger airbags to deploy when they
sense a given amount of force. The second are acceleration sensors that
deploy airbags when they detect sufficiently rapid deceleration.' 3 Both
types of sensors use preprogrammed algorithms which automotive engi-
neers tweak based on real-world information gathered from EDRs.1
4
Given the purpose of EDR technology, automobile manufacturers
should, in theory, use EDRs to collect data not only from accidents
where the airbag did deploy but also from accidents where it did not
deploy. However, perhaps because of the early limitations of the tech-
nology and the larger importance of actual deployment data, safety engi-
neers initially only received data from the devices where the airbags did
in fact deploy. 15 However, later EDR units recorded not only "deploy-
ment events" but also "near-deployment" events (events where the con-
ditions of an airbag's algorithm were almost met), thus providing safety
engineers with additional useful information.'
6
B. How EVENT DATA RECORDERS WORK AND WHAT THEY RECORD
Event data recorders capture a wealth of information, but only for a
very short period. The length of EDR recording time varies depending
on the automobile manufacturer, but none record for more than five
seconds. 17 However, it is not current technological limitations that re-
strict the EDR's recording time.18 Indeed, the cost of computer memory
is negligible. 19 The NHTSA has proposed to standardize EDRs record-
ing time, but still to only eight seconds before the crash and for six
seconds afterwards.
20
During that short recording period, all EDRs installed in cars and
trucks record whether there were any error codes, how long it took the
airbag to deploy, why, based on the algorithms, the airbag deployed,
whether passengers were wearing seatbelts, and the change in velocity
over time.2' General Motors' EDR system also records the throttle posi-
tion, engine rotations per minute, pre-crash vehicle speed, and whether
13 See id.
14 See id. But see Mueller, supra note 7, at 139 & n.21 (arguing that there is no proof that
the automobile manufacturers are using the data for safety purposes based upon his unsuccess-
ful attempts to get the public relations department of a number of major manufacturers to
disclose their use of these data).
15 See Menninger, supra note 6, § 10.
16 See id.
17 See Mueller, supra note 7, at 138 (General Motors' EDR records for a five-second
span).
18 Id. at 165.
'9 Id.
20 Id. at 164-65.
21 See Menninger, supra note 6, § 10.
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the brakes were in use.22 All EDRs keep this information on "non-vola-
tile" memory, meaning that preservation does not require an electronic
power source.23 This is important because the accidents that trigger the
EDR to collect data usually have the potential of cutting-off battery
power to an automobile's electronics.
2 4
As mentioned previously, modem EDR systems currently record
data both when airbags deploy and when airbags almost deploy ("near-
deployment events"). 25 EDRs treat these two types of data differently.
When the airbags deploy, data from that accident stay on the EDR's
memory permanently. 26 On the other hand, when the airbag nearly de-
ploys, the data from that incident stays in the EDR only until a driver has
started the car 250 more times.
27
The format at that memory is saved in, though, depends on the man-
ufacturer. Although the NHTSA has recently made efforts to standardize
EDRs,2 8 they currently record data in a variety of different formats de-
pending on the manufacturer of the vehicle in question.29 Most notably,
despite the present proprietary nature of most EDR data, General Mo-
tors' EDR data are also now easily accessible by interested third par-
ties.30 Specifically, private parties now can connect to a General Motors'
EDR with specialized equipment using software sold for Windows-based
computers. 3 1 Sales of such equipment and software to law enforcement
and other interested parties have increased concerns about EDRs among
privacy experts, and have generally increased the frequency and tenor of
debates concerning EDR use.
C. PREDICTING THE FUTURE OF EVENT DATA RECORDERS IN CARS
What EDRs can do is almost certain to change in the near future.
Changing regulatory trends and unforeseen technological advances make
22 See id.; see also KAREN KOEHLER & MICHAEL FREEMAN, LITIGATING MAJOR AUTo-
MOBILE INJURY AND DEATH CASES DATABASE, § 23:90 (2006).
23 More specifically, EDRs record and store data on what are called Electronically Erasa-
ble Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM). See Menninger, supra note 6, § 10.
24 Id.
25 See supra notes 13-24 and accompanying text.
26 See Menninger, supra note 6, § 10.
27 See id. Why the near-deployment data is erased at this point is unclear. Presumably,
this is done because of constrains on the size of memory installed along with the EDR, which
are artificial as mentioned previously. See supra note 18 and accompanying discussion. Alter-
natively the short-life could be an effort by automobile manufacturers to preserve some pri-
vacy for its customers because after 250 car-starts it is unlikely that there was any sort of
serious accident so any real legal or research purpose for that data does not exist.
28 See Mueller, supra note 7, at 160.
29 See id. at 160; see also Menninger, supra note 6, § 10.
30 See Menninger, supra note 6, §10.
31 The device and software are called "Cash Data Retrieval" and are manufactured by
Vetronix Corporation with no restrictions on their sale to interested parties. See id.
2007]
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it difficult to know what EDRs in automobiles will be like in the future,
but it is possible to predict the range of possibilities by analyzing several
factors, including: (1) what current technology is available for EDRs, but
not yet widely-used; (2) what after-market data-recorders are available
for those who wish to monitor drivers of their own vehicles; (3) what
other transportation and automobile technologies exist that raise similar
privacy concerns; and (4) what are the foreseeable technological ad-
vances in EDR technology.
There are some improvements in EDRs that could be made using
existing technology. The simplest improvement would be to expand the
length of time that EDRs record data. Memory is increasingly inexpen-
sive, so it would cost little to add enough memory so that EDRs can
record, for example, thirty minutes of data surrounding a deployment or
a near-deployment incident. 32 Manufacturers could also presumably ex-
pand the kind of data EDRs collect. Instead of recording data only when
airbags deploy, for example, a car's EDR might record information when
the driver reaches excessive speeds, i.e., a speed that would be illegal in
all fifty states. Certainly, such data would be useful to automobile manu-
facturers and law enforcement in determining whether reckless driving or
a manufacturing defect caused an accident, and they could also be crucial
in a products liability suit. Such information would arguably be impor-
tant for safety purposes as well because it would provide contextual data
about the characteristics of drivers involved in certain types of accidents.
Short of modifying existing EDR technology, there are features that
manufacturers could add to EDRs without the need for new technological
developments. Since airplane data recorders already record voice data,
perhaps the most obvious change to existing automobile data recorders
would be the incorporation of voice recorders. Of course, it is not clear
that voice recorders would be as useful in cars as they are in airplanes.
Although an airplane may crash so quickly that there is nothing to gain
from voice recording, airplane crashes can also occur over a longer pe-
riod in which the pilot and the co-pilot discuss how to avert the crisis. 33
For example, if an airplane crashes during an attempted landing in a
storm, voice data can provide valuable information about the decisions
the pilot and the copilot made. It is difficult to imagine an automobile
crash in which voice data would be as valuable. Beyond expletives or
exclamations of fear moments before the car crashes, what else would a
voice data recorder pick up from the driver or any passengers? While an
airplane pilot might consult with a co-pilot about the proper course of
action while piloting such a complex machine, experience suggests that
32 See Mueller, supra note 7, at 165.
33 See Menninger, supra note 6, § 4 (explaining the value of a large volume of voice data
for airplane crash scene investigators).
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car drivers have neither the time nor the need to consult with their pas-
senger about when to brake, when to turn, etc. The only real value to
voice data would be their ability to tell manufacturers and the NHTSA
how long it took the driver to react or whether the driver was distracted
in any way. Video data recordings of the driver and the passengers might
be slightly more useful for the same limited application, but their value
in the driving, rather than the aviation, setting seems similarly limited
considering how quickly car accidents occur. 34 Despite the resulting
data's seemingly limited value, car manufacturers may nonetheless add
voice and video recorders to the EDR apparatuses installed in America's
automobiles due to the prevalence of such recorders in third-party, after-
market installed EDRs. The added features in these devices make it easy
to predict the range of possibilities for standard EDRs in the future and
present the greatest concern for privacy advocates.
The car rental industry employs some of the most aggressive use of
new, more advanced EDR technology with an estimated 25% of rental
cars equipped with tracking technology. 35 While the extent of advanced
EDR technology use varies among rental car companies, some small,
independent rental car businesses stretch available EDR technology to its
outer limits. For example, one small San Francisco car rental company
used GPS to determine whether a renter had gone outside the permissible
geographic area and fined the renter accordingly. 36 Other companies
charge additional fees if installed electronic surveillance technology sys-
tems determine that renters have driven at excessive speeds. 37 Large
rental car companies, on the other hand, claim to limit the use of ad-
vanced EDR technology in tandem with GPS technology to the retrieval
of stolen or lost vehicles. 38 The use of more advanced EDR technology
in rental cars demonstrates the feasibility of incorporating GPS tracking
with EDRs by car manufacturers and the potential for abuse this combi-
nation might generate.
However, in some respects GPS tracking already incorporates the
EDR technology installed in many cars sold today. Many already
know-from widely run radio and television commercials-about Gen-
34 Video data likely will be used, however, in the airline industry. The National Trans-
portation Safety Board (NTSB) has recommended that the FAA require that airlines equip all
aircraft with video recorders of the cockpit in order to obtain better information on the cause of
airplane crashes. See id. § 19.
35 Jody M. Hausman, Chapter 317: Is Big Brother Along for the Ride, 36 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 806, 806 (2005).
36 See id.
37 See id. at 806-07. Hausman describes a case in which a car rental company fined
customers for reaching speeds over 79 miles per hour for two or more minutes. Id.
38 See id. at 807. As an example, Avis and Budget both claim to use such devices only
to retrieve a stolen car, although they admit that many of their independent franchisees do use
such devices more broadly. Id.
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eral Motors' OnStar service. 39 The dramatic image of a badly injured
passenger saved by OnStar operators communicating through the car and
calling an ambulance often causes viewers to lose track of what is what
is actually causing the OnStar operator to act. Just as airbag deployment
triggers the EDR to retain data about the car during, before, and after the
accident, an airbag deployment travels through OnStar's cellular net-
works and notifies OnStar staff that there has been an accident.
40
Whether OnStar is part of the EDR system or just uses similar informa-
tion to function, it certainly implicates similar privacy concerns and
shows that EDRs could incorporate GPS tracking and voice recording
with little added cost or innovation. OnStar does, however, take pains to
inform customers about how it uses OnStar data.41 OnStar's Privacy
Principles state that the information it will collect from its users includes
the car's location, user preferences, and general usage patterns.42 It fur-
ther states that third parties may illegally tap into such sensitive informa-
tion and that OnStar will give this information to third parties if legally
required to do so or because of safety concerns.
43
The most advanced third-party EDR system available to car owners
who want to monitor use of their vehicles is the "MacBox Telematic."
44
In addition to recording typical EDR data, the MacBox device records
"the vehicle's exact geographic location using GPS, video of the crash,
before, during, and after, and audio recordings of the voices of the occu-
pants. '45 It is mainly intended for professional drivers such as tractor-
trailer and taxi-drivers, 46 but it nonetheless demonstrates the level of
technology available to automobile manufactures. Notably, this system
automatically uploads crash data over cellular networks (much like On-
Star, which notifies its operators in order to alert safety personnel 47) to
an accessible database. 48 The system then alerts government agencies
and the owner of the vehicle that there has been a crash.
49
39 See Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIo N.U. L. RaV. 295, 309
(2004).
40 See Mueller, supra note 7, at 162; see also Glancy, supra note 39, at 309-10. In
addition to safety features, OnStar provides a variety of other services, including assisting
customers with navigation, unlocking cars when customers have locked their keys inside, pro-
viding diagnostic information, and even helping to find restaurants and other entertainment
options. See id. at 310.
41 See id. at 310.
42 Id.
43 See id.
44 See Mueller, supra note 7, at 157.
45 Id. at 157-58.




RIDING WITH LITTLE BROTHER
II. EDR REGULATIONS: INSURANCE COMPANIES, COURTS,
LEGISLATURES, AND THE NHTSA
A. INSURANCE COMPANIES AND EDRs
Insurance companies have already begun to incorporate advanced,
after-market EDR systems into alternative automobile insurance plans in
exchange for reduced rates.50 Progressive Insurance, for example, offers
discounts to customers who install a "TripSense" computer that records
trip duration, miles traveled, the number of aggressive acceleration or
braking events, and amount of time spent at a given speed.
5'
The bargain that Progressive offers-which will likely become
more common in the future-is in an important sense a tougher bargain
than the one General Motors offers to its OnStar customers. In the case
of OnStar, customers receive the safety, entertainment and other benefits
of the service in exchange for potential loss of privacy. Insurance cus-
tomers receiving lower rates in exchange for the release of advanced
EDR data face a far starker choice. They face not a potential, but an
inevitable loss of privacy in the bargain for lower rates. 52 Policy makers
considering the possible regulation of EDR technology must weigh free-
dom of contract concerns against the importance of protecting consumers
from surrendering their privacy rights to market-making insurance
companies.
B. NHTSA AND REFORM
The NHTSA currently collects EDR data, but uses the data in a
simple, straightforward way that does not raise the heckles of too many
privacy advocates. 53 To further its purpose of improving the safety of
American roadways, the NHTSA collects data from as many traffic acci-
dents as it can. These data come in part from EDRs.54 The current
NHTSA framework for collecting EDR data does not concern privacy
advocates because the NHTSA does not collect EDR data without the
permission of a vehicle's owner, nor does it mark any data it collects
with identifiable personal information. 55 Strict regulations for federal
50 See id. at 159. A few states have already banned this type of insurance plan. See, e.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-103 (2005).
51 See Mueller, supra note 7, at 159.
52 See id.
53 See id. at 147.
54 See id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP., NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
EVENT DATA RECORDERS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS BY THE NHTSA EDR WORKING GROUP:
FINAL REPORT 21 (2001), available at http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf70/l38037-web.pdf
[hereinafter NHTSA REPORT].
55 See id. at 147-48 (citing Event Data Recorders, 69 Fed. Reg. 32,932 (June 14, 2004)
(to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 563)).
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agencies ensure that the NHTSA does not directly violate the driver's-
or at least the vehicle-owner's-privacy.
5 6
While the current limited collection of EDR data and the restraints
on such data collection do not, at least superficially, implicate any large
privacy concerns, the efforts of the NHTSA to improve and increase its
collection of EDR data and the use of EDRs generally do potentially
infringe upon the privacy of drivers. The concern about new NHTSA
regulations comes from two changes the NHTSA may make in its next
set of regulations for EDR data collection. First, the NHTSA may aban-
don its view that vehicle owners own EDR data, and second, it may in-
crease its efforts to standardize EDRs and the methods of collecting data
from them. 5
7
In its existing regulation framework, the NHTSA assumes that the
vehicle's owner owns the data from the EDR and therefore it needs the
owner's permission in order to obtain the data.58 In its proposed regula-
tions, the NHTSA does not itself challenge this idea.59 However, com-
ments from interested parties indicate that there are stakeholders who
may push-perhaps successfully-for the NHTSA to alter this stance on
data ownership in order to meet other interests and policy goals. 60 In the
NHTSA's report, the Federal Highway Administration (FHA) expressed
concerns that the NHTSA's old position-that the vehicle's owner owns
the EDR data-severely limits the volume of available EDR data.6 1 It
argues that a way around this problem would be to have the manufacturer
keep some vestigial ownership of the EDR data, allowing federal agen-
cies like the NHTSA easier access to useful EDR data.62
That the NHTSA or other related federal agencies might tear down
the wall protecting EDR data ownership through legal machinations is
not the only privacy concern created by recent proposals. NHTSA's pro-
posed regulations would standardize EDRs with regard to both data crea-
56 See id. at 148 (noting that the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000), prevents
the NHTSA from disclosing any personally identifiable information without written consent
and that the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000), restrains the NHTSA as well
because it prohibits the disclosure of files which would constitute "a clearly unwarranted inva-
sion of personal privacy").
57 See id. at 160-62.
58 See id. at 160.
59 See NHTSA REPORT, supra note 54, at 53. But see Mueller, supra note 7, at 160-62
(arguing that this report represents a departure from NHTSA's previous position on this issue).
60 See NHTSA REPORT, supra note 54, at 53-56.
61 See id. at 53-54.
62 See id. at 54. The FHA believes this could be legally accomplished through, for ex-
ample, contractual provisions giving manufacturers continued rights of access to the data,
through state motor vehicle licensing law, or through other forms of federal regulation giving
public authorities access to the data. Id.
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tion and the methods of collecting this data. 63  While there is no
indication that NHTSA will require manufacturers to install EDRs in
their cars in the near future, by 2008 NHTSA will require manufacturers
who do install them to make the data accessible with just "one single
tool."'64 Such standardization would provide the NHTSA and others con-
cerned with improving automobile safety with more and better quality
data. At the same time, however, it would make it easier for other par-
ties-who are far less disinterested-to obtain a vehicle owner's EDR
data.6
5
C. CURRENT, LIMITED LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT
Few legislatures have attempted to regulate EDR data collection and
usage. 66 There is no federal legislation regarding EDRs. 67 The vast ma-
jority of states have similarly declined to pass legislation formally regu-
lating the use of EDR data. The legislation that a handful of states have
passed is mainly limited to regulating who can obtain EDR data, what
automobile manufacturers must disclose about the EDRs that are in-
stalled in the cars they sell, and how such disclosure must be carried
out.68 The limited nature of state legislation may be explained at least in
part by the inherently national nature of the automobile industry, which
may make it difficult for legislation at the state level to be effective.
Comprehensive federal legislation may be a better and more effective
way to address this issue.
D. COURTS AND EDRs
There has been limited use of EDR data in legal proceedings, either
civil or criminal.69 Nonetheless, examining the cases that do exist
63 See Mueller, supra note 7, at 161 (citing Event Data Recorders, 69 Fed. Reg. 39,932,
32,942-43 (proposed June 14, 2004) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 563)).
64 See id. at 161-62.
65 See id. at 162.
66 See id. at 142.
67 See id. at 142, 160-61 (citing Event Data Recorders, 69 Fed. Reg. at 39,932).
68 Research revealed nines states that have passed and published EDR regulations: Ar-
kansas, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-37-103 (2005) (requiring detailed written disclosure to car
owners regarding the EDRs in their vehicles and prohibiting insurance companies from acces-
sing the data); California, see CAL. VEH. CODE § 9951 (West. Supp. 2006); Colorado, see
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-6-402 (West 2006) (requiring disclosure by manufacturers to car
purchasers and also stating that EDR data is owned by the vehicle owner and cannot be ac-
cessed by anyone else without owner consent except in certain exceptional situations); Maine,
see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1972 (2005); New Hampshire, see N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 357-G:1 (2006), New York, N.Y. VEH. & TRAi. L. § 416-b (McKinney 2005), North Da-
kota, see N.D. CENT. CODE. § 51-07-28 (2005); Texas, see TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN.
§ 547.615 (Vernon Supp. 2006); and Virginia, see VA. CODE. ANN. § 46.2-1088.6 (West
2006).
69 Research uncovered only a handful of opinions where EDR data played any role.
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reveals clear patterns in the ways in which courts and litigants have used
EDR data. The few appellate courts that have addressed this issue have
upheld trial court decisions allowing EDR data.70
In all of the examined cases, either the government or an automobile
manufacturer used EDR data to further its case against the driver.71 This
may be because EDRs are, as is often claimed, so accurate that those
who know EDRs well-law enforcement and auto manufacturers-will
abandon or settle any case if the EDR data indicate that the other side is
in the right. Alternatively, it may be that drivers and their lawyers are
less aware of EDR technology or less capable of using EDR data to their
advantage than are the government and automobile manufacturers. For
example, plaintiffs might have difficulty retaining experts who can ex-
plain how EDRs work and how to interpret their data.
This latter possibility is the less troubling of the two. Over time, it
should be less difficult to find experts to challenge EDR data (assuming
that it can be challenged) because the number of experts on the subject
will increase and some will leave their original employers to work as
experts for the other side. Furthermore, if the NHTSA succeeds in its
goal of making EDR data more standardized and more accessible, 72 then
it will be far easier for the layperson to discover EDR data that support a
case. Thus, while there are privacy concerns associated with standard-
izing EDRs according to the NHSTA's proposals, there are counter-
vailing arguments in favor of standardization. 73  Though more
standardized and easily accessible EDR data would make it easier to in-
vade a driver's privacy, the more accessible data would also help to de-
mocratize the power that this information provides.
With so few examples available of the use of EDR evidence, it is
difficult to know with certainty the value of such evidence in past cases
and to predict its value in the future. Available cases do, however, pro-
vide good examples of how courts and litigants use EDR data in the trial
setting. Two cases in particular show the wide range of effects on a case
when EDR data provides some answer.
In Bachman v. General Motors,74 the plaintiff was severely injured
when she lost control of her 1996 Chevrolet Cavalier and crashed into an
70 See, e.g., Bachman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 776 N.E.2d 262, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
(finding that the trial court was correct when it allowed the defense to present EDR evidence
indicating that the airbag could not have caused the accident in question); People v. Hopkins,
No. 2004-0338, 2004 WL 3093274, at *1, *14 (N.Y. County Ct. Aug. 30, 2004) (admitting
EDR evidence that showed the defendant was driving over 100 miles per hour in a 30 mile per
hour zone when the accident that led to the murder charges against him occurred).
71 See, e.g., id.
72 See supra pp. 209-11.
73 See supra pp. 210-12.
74 776 N.E.2d 262.
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oncoming step van.75 The plaintiff claimed that she was driving between
35-45 miles per hour on a winding road with a 30-mile per hour speed
limit when her airbag unexpectedly deployed, causing her to lose control
of the steering wheel, hit her head, and lose consciousness. 76 She
remembered nothing else from the accident.77 She sued General Motors
and various other defendants, alleging that an improper airbag deploy-
ment caused the accident and the resulting injuries.
78
In a jury trial, two witnesses who saw the accident, one of whom
was the other driver, testified that Bachman looked like she was driving
well over the speed limit and too fast for the bumpy and curvy road
where the accident took place. 79 Both also testified that they did not
notice anything that would indicate that the airbag deployed before the
accident. 80 On the other hand, after the accident, General Motors recal-
led the 1996 Chevrolet Cavalier because the airbag deployed improperly
at times (i.e., at low speeds or when a very small force hit the floor pan
of the car).8' Two other witnesses testified about the condition of the
section of road in question, one stating that it was "wavy and ripply" and
that it caused his car to vibrate when he drove over it,82 the other stating
that "it gave her the feeling that she wanted to lose control.
83
The evidence without EDR data was thus not conclusive in either
direction. However, the EDR data showed that the airbag deployed once
and did so after recording change in velocity above the threshold re-
quired to trigger deployment.84 In contrast, an engineer employed by
one of the defendants further testified, in inadvertent-deployment cases
the change was typically well below the deployment threshold.85 The
jury returned a verdict for the defendants. 86 Though one cannot conclu-
sively determine that the EDR evidence and related expert testimony
made the difference in this case, an objective view of the evidence indi-
cates that it probably had a large effect on the outcome. Accurate EDR
data can thus help the fact-finder and society as a whole get closer to the
truth in a given case and avoid the so-called "battle of the experts"
problem.
75 Id. at 271.
76 Id. at 274.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 270.
79 Id. at 274-75.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 276.
82 Id. at 275.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 279.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 270.
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Of course, if EDR evidence is the "smoking gun" in product liabil-
ity suits against automobile manufacturers, one might ask why we should
bother with any other evidence-perhaps, a trial judge should grant sum-
mary judgment to the defendant on EDR data alone. In fact, this has
happened in at least one case already. In Batiste v. General Motors
Corp. ,87 George Batiste sued General Motors, claiming that the sole and
proximate cause of his injuries was the failure of the airbags on his Olds-
mobile Cutlass to inflate properly when he spun-out and crashed into a
concrete divider on an interstate highway. 88 He argued that because he
was going 50 to 55 miles per hour before he lost control of his vehicle,
and because the owner's manual stated that in normal conditions a crash
into a wall at about nine to fifteen miles per hour should have been
enough to trigger deployment, the airbag sensor should have deployed
the airbag.89 An auto-mechanic and a General Motors engineer, both of
whom analyzed the downloaded EDR data, swore in affidavits that the
EDR did not record sufficient change in longitudinal velocity for airbag
deployment, nor did it record any malfunction in the system to suggest
that the airbags should have deployed but did not.90 Based on these affi-
davits and Batiste's failure to bring forward any experts of his own to
challenge these conclusions, the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of General Motors, a decision that the appeals court subsequently
affirmed. 9'
The Batiste case raises an interesting question concerning the use of
EDR evidence: should EDR by itself determine the outcome of any case?
Granting summary judgment based on EDR data alone does save scarce
judicial resources. Moreover, it reduces the legal costs for manufactur-
ers, a savings that, because of the pressures of competition, they will
presumably pass to the buying public. The flipside of this legal parsi-
mony is that there is a possibility that if the EDR data are not telling the
whole story of the accident, courts will dismiss valid claims against car
manufacturers or valid defenses for criminal defendants. In Batiste, it
could have been that the EDR functioned perfectly, and the airbag sensor
properly did not trigger the airbags to deploy. However, an airbag sensor
is only as good as the programmed parameters that govern its deploy-
ment. Perhaps for safety reasons the airbag sensor should have been
programmed to deploy under the conditions that existed at the time of
this accident, and it was not so programmed. The more the legal system
87 Batiste v. Gen. Motors Corp., 802 So.2d 686 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
88 Id. at 687.
89 See id. at 687-88.
90 Id. at 688.
91 See id. at 687, 690.
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believes and relies on EDR data, the less likely any evidence or argu-
ment-however valid-can overcome its persuasive power.
III. DECIDING WHAT IS MOST IMPORTANT
In order to determine the best way to regulate EDR usage, it is nec-
essary to balance the negative and positive consequences. Accordingly,
we must first determine what are the most and least beneficial aspects of
EDR data.
Safety, privacy, truth, justice, and efficiency are all laudable reasons
to support any kind of reform or regulation. Unfortunately, in the case of
EDRs, there is no one answer that could possibly maximize all of these
important policy goals. For example, if one cared only about privacy and
never about safety or more accurate legal outcomes, one would support
banning the installation or use of all event data recorders. If one only
cared about safety, then one would have the most elaborate EDR imagi-
nable, perhaps like the MacBox Telematic device, 92 moreover the gov-
ernment would automatically receive all such information in order to
determine better ways to make the roads safer. The key then is to deter-
mine where one goal can be maximized with the least expense to other
goals in order to reach the most efficient outcome, keeping in mind that
some goals may be considered more important than others.
As mentioned above, there are certain key tensions among the vari-
ous policy goals associated with EDR usage and the application of EDR
data. The original reason for having EDRs was safety, as evidenced by
the fact that they appeared alongside the airbag.93 Moreover, the
NHTSA's main interest in obtaining more EDR data is to improve the
safety of car travel. 94 The price of safer roads is thus the risk that private
EDR data will be used by insurance companies, the legal system, or other
bodies with interests antagonistic to drivers' privacy concerns.
Another benefit of EDRs might come in the form of more accurate
and efficient trial outcomes. 95 But currently these evidentiary benefits
may actually tip the legal system further in the favor of the automobile
manufacturers and law enforcement bodies who are more experienced
and more knowledgeable about how EDRs work and the data they pro-
duce. Therefore, too much reliance on the EDR to tell the complete story
of an accident might actually diminish its benefits. There is a real ten-
sion between truth, efficiency, and fairness that cuts in a variety of differ-
ent ways.
92 See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
93 See Menninger, supra note 6, §10.
94 See supra Part ll.B.
95 See supra Part I.D.
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IV. FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE: EVENT DATA
RECORDER REGULATION PROPOSALS
A. NOTIFICATION
One author, Patrick Mueller, has already proposed a comprehensive
model legislation that attempts to address the large privacy concerns that
increased EDR usage implicates. 96 His first concern is lack of notice-
he rightly believes that automobile manufacturers do not adequately no-
tify their customers about the existence of EDRs when they buy a car.
97
Currently, auto manufacturers bury any mention of the EDR in the back
of the vehicle owner's manual. 98 Moreover, while there are no surveys
that measure how much car drivers know about EDRs, at least some
industry groups accept that most consumers are ignorant about their exis-
tence. 99 Considering how powerful EDR evidence can be in criminal
and civil proceedings, it is unfortunate, and even unfair, that car drivers
do not know more about EDRs. Certainly, if the general public does not
know about the privacy interests they are trading away, it is difficult to
argue that all of the relevant stakeholders are getting their full say about
how we, as a society, should proceed in this important area of regulation.
In order to address the notification issue, Patrick Mueller proposes
imposing four significant regulations on the auto industry: (1) car manu-
facturers must clearly explain how EDRs work and what they record and
place this information in the front of the owners' manual; (2) car dealers
must inform purchasers that there is an EDR installed in their new vehi-
cle; (3) car dealers must then, a few weeks later, remind their customers
about EDRs located in their cars; and (4) the NHSTA must publish easy
to understand guides about EDRs and what they specifically record.100
Mueller's proposal here seems excessive 0 1 for a number of reasons.
First, as courts, the NHSTA, and others increasingly use EDR informa-
tion, privacy advocates and the media will inform members of the public
about the implications of EDRs and what exactly they record. If the
public finds the privacy intrusion to be too great, it will use the political
process to curtail the intrusion. Second, auto manufacturers and federal
regulators already inundate car drivers with a huge number of warnings,
some mired in legalese. The public's time and attention are scarce, and
warning clutter is therefore a real concern. If the government and the
96 See Mueller, supra note 7, at 167-90.
97 See id. at 175-76.
98 See id. at 175.
99 See id. at 175-76 (citing Michael Ha, Consumer Groups Try to Push Big Brother
Insurer Out of Passenger Seat, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, Apr. 21, 2003 at 14, 16; Cindy Skrzycki,
Data Recorders in Cars Might Open Pandora's Black Box, WASH. POST, July 27, 2004, at
El.).
100 See id. at 177-78.
101 See, e.g., New-Car Black Box Rule, KANSAS CITY STAR, Aug. 23, 2006, at C.
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auto industry are to provide extra warnings about anything, they should
warn about important safety issues related to driving a car. Overloading
America's car drivers with too many extraneous and less important con-
cerns might start to crowd out their awareness of other more crucial
safety information.
Finally, the notification issue is not as crucial an issue as Mueller
paints it to be because presumably the media and popular culture will,
over time, bring EDR technology into the consciousness of the public.
When this happens, notification will be superfluous; those who care
enough to pay attention to the bombardment of notification documents
that Mueller proposes will already know that the EDRs exist. However,
considering the push from the NHSTA to increase collection and stand-
ardization of EDRs and the implications of such a move in both the crim-
inal and civil contexts, not only whether, but when consumers lose this
veil of ignorance is exceedingly important.
Therefore, one legislative solution would be to force the NHSTA
and automobile manufacturers to delay increasing EDR installation, tech-
nology, and accessibility until the public is more fully informed. A quick
way to increase public awareness is to have the NHSTA create and run
an ad campaign that explains what EDRs are and what they record. This
would in turn give the public a chance to have its voice heard before
inertia leads to a policy debate in which the public cannot fully
participate.
B. CONSENT
The current lack of consent to EDR data collection also troubles
Mueller, 10 2 who argues that authorities might use EDR evidence against
a driver in a civil or criminal proceeding without the driver first having
agreed to incur this legal risk.10 3 To address this issue, Mueller proposes
that cars equipped with EDRs come with a switch that allows the driver
to affirmatively turn EDR data recording on or off.' °4 Furthermore,
Mueller argues that cars should come from the factory with the EDR
switches turned off in the hopes that this will force the NHSTA and the
automobile manufactures to educate more drivers about the public safety
benefits of providing such data.105
Mueller's proposal amounts to nothing or risks rendering EDRs ef-
fectively useless. This proposal would amount to nothing if insurance
companies threaten to charge much higher rates for car drivers who re-
fuse to turn on their EDRs since such a refusal would most likely corre-
102 See Mueller, supra note 7, at 178-80.
103 See id.
104 See id. at 180.
105 See id.
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late to those who also drive more recklessly. The proposal could thus
severely damage the statistical credibility of EDR data, making both
technological and political progress in the field of automotive safety
more difficult. If the default is that the EDR is off, drivers will have to
affirmatively decide to turn on the EDR recording, almost certainly re-
ducing the data points the NHSTA and others interested in improving
automobile safety can use. Further, the data obtained would skew to-
wards certain kinds of drivers. Moreover, if changes in automobile de-
sign or changes to traffic laws coming from EDR data collection are not
based on the full spectrum of drivers, they will be less effective.
Finally, it is unclear why consent should be an issue in the first
place. Should a driver also have to consent to an accident reconstruction
based on the state of his own car? The EDRs that manufacturers cur-
rently install in cars record very limited information and only in the few
moments before and after an accident. 106 Perhaps then Mueller objects
less to the limited data that EDRs currently record and more to the possi-
bility that EDRs could, in the future, record more intimate details that
one wishes to keep private. However, he fails to make this clear. The
better solution to this concern-whether exactly shared by Mueller or
not-is to limit what EDRs record and who can use this information.
C. WHAT SHOULD EDRs RECORD AND WHO SHOULD HAVE ACCESS
TO THEM
Mueller explains in detail other concerns regarding EDR usage and
what legislative and regulative changes he believes will best address the-
ses concerns. 107 Despite assurances from relevant experts that EDR data
are accurate, 10 8 Mueller worries about the quality of EDR data.'0 9 In ad-
dition, Mueller expresses concern that the government, and even other
third parties, may use EDR data too extensively. 10 He attempts to ad-
dress this issue in two ways."' First, he proposes to destroy EDR data
when the data no longer serves any safety or evidentiary function.'
12
Second, he argues that outside of collecting anonymous EDR data for
safety purposes, we should not allow third parties access to EDR data
without a court order. 11
3
Technological assurances about data quality may not be enough to
assuage those concerned that people might lose civil lawsuits or be con-
106 See supra Part I.B.
107 See Mueller, supra note 7, at 180-90.
108 See supra text accompanying notes 69-90.
109 See Mueller, supra note 7, at 180-83.
110 See id. at 184-86.
I' See id. at 185-86.
112 See id. at 185.
13 See id. at 186-87.
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victed on faulty EDR data. While there is little dispute in the courts
about the admissibility of EDR data, it is troubling that a party might lose
on summary judgment or be convicted based solely on EDR data since
this information is better understood by the automobile manufacturers
who designed EDRs and the law enforcement officials who routinely col-
lect such data than it is by laypeople. 14 Courts and legislatures should
refrain from allowing EDR data to settle the matter without more evi-
dence in the criminal context or when the other litigant has reasonable
evidence that may refute the EDR findings, at least until EDR technology
is more widely understood. The risks to life, liberty, and property posed
by sole reliance on potentially faulty EDR data should trump the interest
in judicial efficiency.
Still, the truth that EDR evidence can help unmask is important
enough to push for its use in trials as much as is reasonably possible. In a
civil context, it is understandable to limit the recovery of EDR data for
evidentiary purposes to only when litigants can obtain a court order for
the aforementioned reasons. Nevertheless, in a criminal case, law en-
forcement should be allowed to access EDR data upon simply a showing
of probable cause and not only after obtaining a search warrant or some
other court order. Otherwise, there is a large risk that EDR evidence will
be lost because of either damage or owner tampering. Therefore, com-
prehensive legislation regulating EDR information access should only al-
low a third party to obtain the EDR through a court order or-when the
third party is law enforcement-upon a showing of probable cause.
The final question is what we should allow EDRs to collect. EDRs
should only collect data with the highest ratios of potential safety bene-
fits relative to invasions of privacy. Therefore, legislatures and regula-
tory bodies should limit EDR recording to no more than ten minutes
before and after an accident and only allow objective information pro-
vided by the vehicles sensors to be recorded. It is hard to imagine how
voice recordings, video recordings and further records of a driver's be-
havior do little more than intrude on a driver's constitutional right to
privacy.
CONCLUSION
The goals of safer roads, privacy protection, and more efficient and
more accurate trial outcomes inevitably conflict when planning EDR reg-
ulation. The legislative scheme with the best balance of these policy
goals would do the following: (1) delay more expansive EDR implemen-
tation until the public is more fully aware about the existence of EDRs;
(2) ensure that EDRs be installed in all vehicles; (3) prevent insurance
114 See supra Part I.D.
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companies and other third parties from using EDR regulation against
their clients without a court order or, in the case of law enforcement,
without probable cause for retrieving EDR data; (4) encourage courts to
use EDR data, but discourage them from relying on EDR data alone; and
(5) limit EDR recordings to objective information no more than ten min-
utes before and after an accident. Such a scheme could improve automo-
bile safety by contributing to research, as well as increase the accuracy
and efficiency of civil and criminal proceedings, while still protecting
individual privacy.
